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I.

INTRODUCTION

“I was in the air, with outstretched arms, and floating fast.
There was a fearful dark river that I had to go over, and I was afraid.
It rushed and roared and was full of angry foam. Then I looked down
and saw many men and women who were trying to cross the dark
and fearful river, but they could not. Weeping, they looked up to me
and cried: “Help us!” Black Elk Speaks.3

Black Elk witnessed the full arc of his tribes’ interaction with
colonizers. Born in 1863, he grew into a wičháša wakhą or ‘holy
man’ of the Oglála Sioux tribe in time to see the virtual destruction
of his people, the land they knew, and their way of life.4 Today,
tribes are re-tracing that journey, hoping to reverse the effects of
centuries of cultural, environmental, and actual genocide, and regain
a modicum of what was lost. Before they can arrive, tribes must
cross a “dark and fearful river....” The river is dark because it is
chock full of poison; fearful because returning the river to a healthy
state seems a Sisyphean undertaking.
In this article, the river represents the polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB) contamination that is ubiquitous in the water, land,
animals, plants, and the physical bodies of Native Americans
themselves. Toxic pollutants such as PCBs affect all humankind,
but the dark, deleterious presence of PCBs disproportionally affects
Native Americans.5 Native American tribes and their members have
suffered, are currently suffering, and will continue to suffer from the
environmental and public health crises perpetuated by PCBs, but
emerging tort theories offer a glimmer of hope for a financial
remedy.6 The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of
how PCBs affect Native land and peoples, and show how tribes can
begin the process of ameliorating and remediating PCB
contamination through traditional and emerging tort theories which
seek to hold the source of PCBs, Monsanto, financially responsible
for the harm they caused. PCB contamination affects Native peoples
3

JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS: THE COMPLETE EDITION 154 (2014).
See Id.
5
See discussion infra Section V.A.
6
See discussion infra Section IV.
4
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around the world, but this article relies heavily on tribes located in
the Pacific Northwest and their relationship to salmon as a focal
point to guide the discussion.
Tribal, state, and city authorities are currently pursuing or
have settled product liability, public nuisance and other common
law and statutory tort claims brought against Monsanto7 for PCB
contamination.8 “Sovereign-led” litigation melds traditional
plaintiff common law tort litigation with sovereign-led
environmental suits and is an emerging trend in environmental law.9
Tort claims against the manufacturers of contaminants ubiquitous in
the environment give sovereigns a new angle for pursuing damages
separate from a traditional statutory environmental claim under
federal or state regulatory schemes, such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA). For example, a strict liability products claim based on
failure-to-warn and defective design theories allows tribes to avoid
the difficult task of proving the origin and circumstances of any
given PCB release because those theories do not require such proof.
This is particularly relevant to PCB contamination, because since
1935 Monsanto has been the sole producer of PCBs in the United
States.10 Thus, Monsanto is the only possible source of most PCB
contamination, eliminating the need for market-share or
commingled-product theories.11
Furthermore, internal Monsanto documents show that
Monsanto was well aware of the negative impacts of PCBs decades
before such information became public knowledge and PCB was

The original Monsanto Chemical Co. “Old Monsanto” underwent a series of
corporate spin offs and acquisitions beginning in 1997. As a result, PCB
plaintiffs have identified the following corporations as bearing responsibility for
Old Monsanto’s PCB contamination: Bayer, Pharmacia, Pfizer, Solutia, and
Monsanto (“New Monsanto”). New Monsanto was acquired by Bayer in 2018.
For ease of reading, this article will simply refer to those entities collectively as
“Monsanto”; See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition at 5-6, Back v. Monsanto,
No. 18SL-CC03530 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 2020).
8
See e.g. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition at 5-6, Back v. Monsanto, No.
18SL-CC03530 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 2020); Complaint, Washington v.
Monsanto, No. 16-2-29591-6 (King Co. Super. Ct. 2016); City of Seattle v.
Monsanto Co., 387 F.Supp.3d 1141, 1148 (W.D.Wash., 2019).
9
Eric L. Klein & Graham C. Zorn, Def. Research Inst., Beyond MTBE: Where
Sovereign-Led Litigation Goes from Here, FOR THE DEF. 4 (June 2017)
[hereinafter Beyond MTBE].
10
Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, Monsanto, PCBs, and the creation of a
“world-wide ecological problem”, J. PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY, Nov. 2018 at 465.
11
Beyond MTBE, supra note 9, at 4.
7
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effectively banned statutorily.12 Those documents are compelling
evidence for key elements of strict liability claims. Thus, the mere
presence of PCBs in the environment may be enough to support a
finding of liability against Monsanto.
Additionally, sovereign plaintiffs may seek damages for the
loss of value of a natural resource, such as a fishery or a drinking
water supply.13 Even natural resources without a direct economic
use can be calculated to form part of an award for damages.14
Finally, sovereigns may be able to employ outside counsel on a
contingency fee basis, alleviating much of the risk and financial
burden.15
Part II of this article explores the history of PCB production,
including Monsanto’s knowledge of the negative health effects of
PCB exposure and continues with a discussion of how PCB
negatively affects Native populations through its accumulation in
marine life. In Part III, we briefly review the history of sovereignled suits brought to address public health issues, potential causes of
action against Monsanto for PCB contamination, and threshold
issues of standing tribal plaintiffs must establish in order to defeat a
motion to dismiss. Part IV discusses PCB litigation by the St. Regis
Mohawk Tribe, the State of Washington, and the City of Seattle.
Finally, Part V argues that Native Americans are disproportionately
affected by PCB contamination in the environment and concludes
with a discussion of issues tribal plaintiffs may confront in PCB
litigation against Monsanto.
II.

HISTORY OF PCB IN THE UNITED STATES

Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are part of an extremely
prevalent group of manufactured organic chemicals called

12

See discussion infra Section II.A.
Graham Zorn & Eric Klein, Natural Resource Damages: A New Angle In PCB
Litigation, LAW 360 (April 05, 2017),
https://plus.lexis.com/api/document?Id.=urn:contentItem:5N7V-VVN1-K0BBS0R1-00000-00&Id.type=PID.&context=1530671
14
E.g., DESVOUGES ET AL., MEASURING NONUSE DAMAGES USING CONTINGENT
VALUATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL
EVALUATION OF ACCURACY (2d. Ed. 2010) available at
http://www.rti.org/sites/default/files/resources/bk-00011009_web.pdf.
15
Beyond MTBE, supra note 13.
13
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chlorinated hydrocarbons.16 They are made by attaching chlorine
atoms to biphenyl rings, which are composed of carbon and
hydrogen.17 While chlorinated hydrocarbons range in physical and
chemical properties, PCBs are commonly known for being tasteless
and odorless.18 PCBs are also known for having a high boiling point,
being nonflammable, being insoluble in water, and not oxidizing in
air.19 These properties have resulted in the use of PCBs in a large
array of products ranging from copy paper to electrical equipment.20
Due to the commonplace nature of many of these products, PCBs
are a pervasive part of our everyday life.
A. Production of PCBs
PCBs were first manufactured in 1929 and used primarily as
a fluid coolant, and by the early 1930s Swann Chemical Company
began to produce them in the United States.21 In 1933, Monsanto
acquired most of Swann’s shares and officially bought the company
in 1935.22 Once Monsanto acquired Swann, it was the only PCB
producer in the entire country.23 The original Monsanto exists as
three present day entities after various acquisitions and mergers.24
In 1997, Monsanto transitioned its industrial chemical and fibers
into a new corporation, Solutia Inc.25 Additionally, in 2000,
Monsanto began focusing solely on the agricultural side of its
business, while Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc took over the chemical
businesses.26
Monsanto was aware that PCBs were being used in products
like transformers that were to be widely distributed.27 In fact, their
product codes demonstrate that they intended to use PCBs in
16

Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), United States Environmental Protection
Agency, (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) https://www.epa.gov/pcbs/learn-aboutpolychlorinated-biphenyls-pcbs#what.
17
Complaint for Damages at 9, Bard v. Monsanto, No. 18-2-00001-7 (King Co.
Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2018).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
MARKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 479.at 465.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Timeline: History of Monsanto Co, Thomson Reuters,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-food-monsanto/corrected-timeline-historyof-monsanto-co-Id.USTRE5AA05Q20091111.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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products like “electrical insulation, flameproofers, paints, varnishes,
adhesives, lacquers, moisture proof paper, heat transfer,
impregnation, delustering rayon, plasticizers, fireproofing cloth,
ink, lubrication, temperature control equipment, and chewing
gum.”28
After New Deal legislation was passed and the United States
began its involvement in World War II, there was a significant
increase in electrification products that led to a huge demand for
insulating materials that PCBs were commonly used in.29
Recognizing this market development, Monsanto began heavily
advertising products containing PCBs.30
B. Growing Recognition of Toxicity
The side effects of PCBs were noted early on in their
production, and the increase in demand for PCB-laden products led
to a greater understanding of their deleterious effect on human
health.31 Early manufacturers realized that the process of
chlorinating diphenyl created an unstable chemical compound that
released hydrochloric acid.32 When hydrochloric acid came into
contact with the worker's skin, it led to various infections and skin
disease.33 Workers involved in large scale production began
developing a serious skin condition called chloracne, which
produces “disfiguring pustules and blackheads.”34 These infections
led Swann to conduct a study with Dr. Frederick Flinn, a professor
at Columbia University, to determine whether PCBs could cause
dermatitis.35 Dr. Flinn reported that “if a leak or spillage occur[ed]
the immediate bathing under these circumstances should be insisted
on.”36 This statement demonstrates that Swann, and eventually
Monsanto, were aware of the potential risks associated with PCBs
prior to their mass production.37
A few years later, in 1937, the Dean of Public Health at
Harvard University, Cecil Drinker, wrote an article that discussed
28

Id. at 466.
Id.
30
Id. at 473.
31
Id. at 474
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 466.
35
Id. at 467.
36
Id.
37
Id.
29
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his own concerns about “the possibility of systemic effects
following ingestion or inhalation of such products.”38 His study
concluded that chlorinated biphenyls could cause liver and skin
damage.39 In response to this study, the future Medical Director of
Monsanto, R. Emmet Kelly, stated that though there were some skin
issues observed in workers, the cause thereof had never been
attributed to chlorinated biphenyls.40 He further claimed that there
were no “systemic reactions” among workers who manufactured the
chemical.41 One year after his initial study, Drinker wrote a “Report
to the Monsanto Chemical Company” in which he warned Monsanto
that the high toxicity of chlorinated biphenyls made them dangerous,
and “no liberties can be taken with it.”42
Within this same timeframe, internal communications for
Monsanto discussed the toxicity of chlorinated biphenyls.43 One
Monsanto official wrote that “prolonged exposure to Aroclor vapors
evolved at high temperatures or by repeated oral ingestion will lead
to systemic toxic effects.”44 Aroclor is an industrial trade name for
a specific type of PCB mixture used commonly as a coolant and as
transformer fluid.45
Additionally, during the early 1940s, the New York Division
of Industrial Hygiene investigated two cable plants that were known
to use chlorinated naphthalene, which is a similar chemical from the
same category of chlorinated hydrocarbons.46 They discovered that
several workers at both plants had died due to liver damage, and
several more had cases of dermatitis.47 The department concluded
its report by stating that chlorinated biphenyls were highly toxic and
needed to be handled with extreme care due to the risks associated
with exposure.48

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. at 469.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), United States Environmental Protection
Agency, https://www.epa.gov/pcbs/learn-about-polychlorinated-biphenylspcbs#what.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 470.
39
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By 1944, Monsanto was warning their salesmen about the
adverse effects of PCBs in products.49 In a manual produced by the
company, Monsanto warned workers of the toxicity of chemicals in
Aroclor, listing symptoms like “acute yellow atrophy of the liver.”50
In a service bulletin published by Monsanto a few years later, they
also warned employees about “skin-eruptions” that could be caused
by exposure to Aroclor.51
During the mid-1950s, Dr. Kelly, Monsanto’s Medical
Director, stated that Monsanto was aware that Aroclors were toxic
but there was no known Maximum Allowable Concentration.52 He
also expressed concern for PCBs in household products because the
usage and exposure of these chemicals could not be monitored.53
In the 1960s, an industrial hygienist in Monsanto’s medical
department wrote to a tool company in Chicago regarding
Monsanto’s brand of hydraulic fluid, Pydraul.54 The memo
explained that Pydraul was an insoluble fluid and because of its
density would sink if it was released into streams or other bodies of
water.55 This was problematic due to the fact that a typical use for
Pydraul was for hydraulic fluid in submarine periscope housings,
increasing opportunities for leaks.56 The memo further elaborated
by stating that if “discharged in large concentrations it will adversely
affect the organisms in the body of the receiving stream which will
affect the aquatic life in the stream.”57 At this point in time, Pydraul
was also being used in various industrial processes and in the food
industry, with leaks being recorded from deep fryers.58
During this period, corporations began expressing concerns
about the use of Pydraul.59 States began to pass laws that required
certain products to contain a label identifying any dangers.60 An

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 466.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 477.
55
Id. at 470.
56
Gerald Markowitz, From Industrial Toxins to Worldwide Pollutants: A Brief
History of Polychlorinated Biphenyls, PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS, Oct. 2018 at
722.
57
MARKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 479.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 478.
60
Id.
50
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internal communication within Monsanto revealed that the company
was worried about how these regulations would impact their sales.61
In the same decade, a study that was conducted to study the
effects of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) found alarming
amounts of PCBs in fish and fauna, particularly in fish and sea
birds.62 Even more disturbing, PCB had been discovered in human
depot fat.63 The study found traces of the chemical in salmon, sea
eagles, fir tree needles, and in the hair of a baby.64 In 1968, Elmer
Wheeler, a member of Monsanto’s Medical Department, wrote a
piece for the National Agricultural Chemical Association.65 His
article touched upon the fact that PCB was impossible to control and
definitively toxic.66 The article also stated that there were no
permissible levels of PCBs due to their extreme toxicity, and that
PCBs were causing peregrine falcons to go extinct by thinning the
shells of their eggs.67 Thus, within just a few decades of production
within the United States, PCBs were being used in household
products all over the country despite manufacturers possessing a
concrete understanding of the risks to the environment and human
health.68
The detrimental effects of PCBs were being discovered
outside the United States as well.69 In 1969, thousands of people in
Japan consumed rice oil that contained PCBs.70 The contamination
was caused by a leakage during manufacturing.71 Of the 14,000
people who consumed the oil, 1,867 people contracted what is now
called Yusho disease.72 Symptoms of Yusho disease include “acnelike eruptions, pigmentation of the skin, nails, and conjunctiva,
increased discharge from eyes, and numbness in the limbs.”73 Once
ingested, PCBs crossed the placenta barrier, which in turn led to

61

Id.
Id. at 482.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 488.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 484.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 497.
73
Bommanna G. Loganathan & Shigeki Masunaga, PCBs, Dioxins and Furans:
Human Exposure and Health Effects, 2 HANDBOOK OF TOXICOLOGY OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, 239 (2015).
62
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infants being born with the disease.74 A 2007 study with victims of
Yusho disease found that the effects of exposure lasted two
generations.75
Recognizing the dangerous effects of PCBs, Monsanto
started working with companies to manage contamination.76
However, Monsanto adopted the disingenuous stance that any
contamination was due to the lack of care on the part of their
customers.77 In the 1970s, the prevalence of products containing
PCBs forced Monsanto to publicly acknowledge the environmental
dangers.78 In a public letter written by Monsanto’s Director of Sales,
the already widespread PCB contamination was alluded to by a
vague admission that PCBs “had been discovered at some point in
some marine, aquatic, and wildlife environments.”79
Monsanto continued to claim that they were working to
control PCBs and that it was not a common household product in an
attempt to maintain its reputation.80 This was a blatant falsity —
since their creation over forty years earlier, PCBs were prevalent in
households in the form of electrical insulation, paint, and printer
paper.81 Although Monsanto actively obfuscated the serious health
risks posed by PCBs, Monsanto eventually announced that it would
begin to restricted sales due to concerns that PCBs caused birth
defects in animals.82
Despite making public statements that they would begin
restricting sales, Monsanto continued to produce products
containing PCBs and kept searching for new markets for their
products.83 Monsanto continued selling PCBs in closed systems by
having its customers sign a contract stating that the client knew
about the toxicity of PCBs. In a move particularly relevant to this
article, Monsanto even considered approaching Native American
tribes during this period to sell their products containing PCBs.84
Further studies added to the growing body of research
showing the negative impacts caused by PCB contamination. In
74

MARKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 497.
LOGANATHAN, supra note 73.
76
MARKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 489.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 498.
79
Id. at 500.
80
Id. at 502.
81
Id. at 466.
82
Id. at 404.
83
Id. at 510
84
Id. at 510, 518.
75
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1966, a Mississippi zoologist released a study that found that a
Monsanto plant was polluting a nearby creek where fish with high
levels of PCBs were detected.85 The fish were deformed, sick, and
lethargic. Within a year of the plant’s closing, the ecology of the
creek had significantly improved.86 Another study found that bottom
feeders like goldfish were particularly susceptible to the harmful
effects of PCBs.87 The study found goldfish with many physical
deformities, including stubs where fins should be and eyes popping
out of their sockets.88
With more information about PCBs becoming widely
available to the public, the United States National Cancer Institute
met in 1975 to review numerous studies and ultimately concluded
that PCB led to carcinomas.89 Later, an Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) conference discussed traces of PCB discovered in
human breast milk.90 PCBs were found to be ten times more
persistent than DDT, a commonly used insecticide that had
suspected carcinogenic qualities.91 By the end of 1975, the EPA
called for a voluntary ban on PCBs, asking Monsanto to cease
production.92 Russel Train, the EPA Administrator during that time
stated that since the beginning of PCB production in 1929, 700
million pounds of PCBs had been manufactured, 300 million of
which were still present in air, water, and soil.93
In 1976, Monsanto finally announced its plans to phase out
PCB manufacturing and later that year, the Senate passed the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA).94 As of 1979, PCB manufacturing
has been banned in the United States, however, some products
containing PCBs are allowed to continue being used subject to
compliance with the TSCA.95 The TSCA continues to manage
storage, disposal, processing, and distribution of PCBs.96

85

Id. at 519.
Id.
87
Id. at 520.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 524.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 525.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 526.
95
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA) COMPLIANCE, 40 C.F.R. §700
(1976), available at https://www.epa.gov/compliance/toxic-substances-controlact-tsca-compliance-monitoring. (last visited Date) Per BB Rule 18.1
96
Id.
86
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Despite the fact that PCB production has been illegal for
several decades, the ubiquitous presence of PCBs in the
environment, food chain, and human bodies themselves has
propelled continued research into their harmful effects.
Contemporary studies have shown that PCB in maternal serum at
levels of 9.7 ng/ml can limit brain development in children as well
as affect their attention spans and IQ levels.97 PCBs have also been
linked to abnormal levels of thyroid hormones in infants, which
affect physical growth and brain development.98 Children born with
higher PCB levels suffered from lower birth weight, which can
cause other issues such as high blood pressure, cardiovascular
disease, diabetes, and strokes.99 Ultimately, the harm caused by
PCBs continues to occur even as we gain a clearer understanding of
their adverse effects due to their extreme prevalence in everyday
products and their difficulty breaking down in natural environments.
C. Bioaccumulation in Marine Life
Bioaccumulation is “the net accumulation of a contaminant
in, and in some special cases on, an organism . . . .”100 This process
is particularly prevalent in aquatic ecosystems because
phytoplankton, small organisms at the base of the food pyramid,
collect nutrients from the water that are critical to their growth.101
As they collect nutrients, phytoplankton also collect any chemicals
present in the water.102 Although chemicals like PCBs can exist in
concentrations so low they cannot be detected by instruments used
to measure their presence in bodies of water, the process of
bioaccumulation results in significant contamination for certain
species
Phytoplankton are at the bottom of the food web, so once
they uptake PCB, larger organisms like zooplankton and smaller fish
consume phytoplankton and the number of toxins in those species
97

PCBs in Farmed Salmon, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, (last visited
Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.ewg.org/research/pcbs-farmed-salmon.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
MICHAEL C. NEWMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOTOXICOLOGY: THE SCIENCE
OF POLLUTION 97 (5th ed. 2020).
101
Bioaccumulation/Biomagnification Effects, U.S ENV‘T PROT. AGENCY (last
visited Nov. 13, 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/bioaccumulationbiomagni
ficationeffects.pdf.
102
Id.
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becomes more concentrated.103 This process repeats at every step of
the food chain and is called biomagnification.104 Since PCBs are
difficult to break down, aquatic organisms store them in their fatty
tissues.105 Thus, organisms who are top predators within the food
web, like salmon, can accumulate PCB in their systems to the point
of suffering from deformities and death.106 This can occur even if
PCB levels in the body of water itself are low.107 Due to salmon’s
predatory nature, they can experience PCB build-up at twenty-tothirty times the levels in their environment.108
One study looking at PCB determinants in Coho salmon
found that most PCB uptake occurs via food consumption.109 The
study also found that PCB concentrations increase exponentially
with salmon length and in some fish, concentrations could double
within the span of the year.110
A different study looked at PCB magnification in migrating
Pacific salmon, a species particularly indicative of PCB impacts due
to their ability to travel from the ocean to freshwater streams when
they spawn.111 The salmon deplete their lipids during their prespawning period, which can potentially magnify hydrophobic
organic contaminants (HOCs) which, in turn, increase toxicity risk
for salmon.112 If salmon are unable to transform or eliminate the
HOCs they have accumulated, the loss of lipid that occurs during
the upriver migration can cause “magnification of the lipidnormalized concentrations” of contaminants like PCBs in their
tissue.113
In pre-migration salmon, HOC concentrations are near the
threshold for toxic effects, which means the salmon are at a point
where they can no longer detoxify themselves from PCBs.114 In
103

Id.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 97.
109
Charles P. Madenjian et al., Net Trophic Transfer Efficiency of PCBs to Lake
Michigan Coho Salmon From Their Prey, 32 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 3063, 3063
(1998).
110
Id. at 3065.
111
Adrian M. H. Debruyn et al., Magnification and Toxicity of PCBs, PCDDs,
and PCDFs in Upriver-Migrating Pacific Salmon, 38 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 6271,
6271 (2004).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
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post-migration, they are predicted to meet or exceed the toxic
threshold.115 This could in turn affect their embryos who are more
sensitive to HOCs.116 Since egg survival is crucial to salmon
populations, PCB pollution can have serious detrimental effects on
survival rates.117 Pacific salmon populations have been decreasing
since the 1960s, which coincides with high PCB concentrations.118
Not only does salmon depletion make communities that rely
on seafood for nutrition and income more vulnerable, it also
indicates an issue with aquatic ecosystems on a broader scale.
Salmon are considered indicator species, which means that the
health of salmon populations indicate whether rivers and oceans are
thriving.119 The health of salmon is directly impacted by the health
of the ecosystem.120 Salmon are exposed to a wide range of
ecosystems because some salmon species live in both river and
ocean systems.121 These salmon travel long distances and return to
the same space each year when spawning.122 Because of salmon’s
relationship to the rest of the ecosystem, bioaccumulation of PCBs
in salmon demonstrates a greater issue of contamination that
impacts other species and their environs.
D. PCB Persistence in Aquatic Ecosystems
PCBs were banned in the United States several decades
ago.
While the ban has resulted in lower PCB levels in aquatic
ecosystems, PCBs will continue to exist in the environment for the
foreseeable future due to their existence in machinery and
equipment that is still being used today and due to upcycling in food
webs.124 When animals with PCBs in their systems die, PCBs don’t
die with them.125 Instead, animal tissue breaks down, which allows
123
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PCBs to continue cycling through the food web.126 For these
reasons, many aquatic ecosystems are still recovering from the
pervasiveness of PCBs, demonstrating that the ban has not
eradicated the problem.
In San Francisco Bay, PCBs continue to exist both on the
land and in the watershed. Decades after the ban, the levels of PCBs
in sportfish remain up to ten times higher than the threshold of
concern for human health.127 Equipment that contains PCBs, like
transformers, can be used for several decades and is still in use today
despite the known dangers of PCB pollution.128
In an attempt to remedy PCB pollution in the San Francisco
Bay, the San Francisco Regional Water Quality Control Board
established a PCB total maximum daily load (TMDL).129 The
California State Legislature also implemented various programs to
remediate San Francisco Bay during the 1980s and 1990s in
response to its designation as a toxic hot spot.130 In addition, the
California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
created a fish consumption advisory that still exists today.131
Finally, California created the California Toxics Rule that instituted
human health criteria for PCBs at 170pg/L in the water.132 This
criterion was created to protect against “human cancer risk for fish
consumers from waters meeting these PCB concentrations.”133 The
criteria set forth by the state of California are almost always
exceeded in the San Francisco Bay.134
Sportfish, which are big-game, bony, saltwater fish, are one
of the main indicators of the severity of PCB pollution in the Bay
because they accumulate high levels of the pollutant and are found
near shore where fishermen often frequent.135 Approximately 86%
of fish samples taken during one study had PCB concentrations
higher than the threshold for a potential human health concern, and
the recommended rate of consumption for sportfish caught in the
bay are two per month, with stricter recommendations for children,
126
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pregnant individuals, and those who are breastfeeding.136
Additionally, 90% of the samples collected in different monitoring
spots within San Francisco Bay exceeded the criteria set by the
California Toxics Rule.137 Various bird species and harbor seals in
the bay also have elevated PCB levels.138
Washington state is also struggling with the effects of PCB
contamination in its aquatic ecosystems.139 The Puget Sound has
high levels of PCB, especially in comparison to other waterways.140
A representative of the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife
stated that the “Puget Sound is a PCB hotspot. What gets in the
sound stays in the sound.”141 One of the reasons PCBs remain in the
sound for so long is because of their hydrophobic nature.142 PCB
molecules repel water, which allows them to attach to other
organisms or sediments instead of dissolving.143 Their inability to
dissolve makes them more likely to be taken up by bacteria or
plankton in the sound, which then gets consumed by fish.144
The Puget Sound is extremely deep.145 Its depth allows for
zooplankton, a primary food source for krill, to thrive.146 PCB levels
in Chinook salmon in the sound also impact their growth, immunity
to disease, and hormone levels.147 Overall, one-third of fish samples
studied in Puget Sound had contaminant levels high enough to cause
health risks to themselves and to organisms, including humans, who
consumed them.148
III.

LITIGATION STRATEGY

A. History of Sovereign-led Suits to Combat Public Health
Crises
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There is a substantial history in United States jurisprudence of
sovereigns and other government actors pursuing tort claims against
manufacturers of various products for the harms those products have
caused the public. One high-profile example is the tobacco litigation
pursued by various State Attorneys General and the United States
Department of Justice.149 Although product liability suits against
tobacco manufacturers had been pursued by private individuals
since the 1950s, early suits were almost universally unsuccessful.150
The turning point in holding tobacco manufacturers responsible was
the discovery and publication of internal documents showing that
tobacco companies knew of the health risks of smoking and actively
hid such knowledge from the public.151
Another high profile example of sovereign-led suits that seek to
remedy a public health crisis, including suits by many Native
American tribes,152 involves suing opioid manufacturers and
distributors.153 In 2017, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services declared the opioid epidemic a public health
emergency,154 spurring a plethora of lawsuits against opioid
manufacturers by tribes, states, counties, and cities.155 Tribal
plaintiffs, such as the Cherokee Flandreau Santee and Rosebud
Sioux, and the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate have filed suit against
opioid manufacturers for the following tort claims: (1) public
nuisance; (2) negligence and gross negligence; (3) unjust
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enrichment; and (4) civil conspiracy.156 Sovereign-led opioid
litigation argues that opioid manufacturers’ unethical marketing and
prescribing practices make them liable for the harms caused by the
opioid epidemic.157 This emerging tort strategy immediately
prompted a lively policy debate.158
Finally, PCB tort litigation is similar to state suits based on
MTBE contamination which hit their high watermark with a $236
million dollar judgment in New Hampshire against Exxon Mobil
Corp.159 Beginning in the 1970s, gasoline manufacturers began to
use MTBE as an additive to replace lead, boost octane, and reduce
engine knock.160 After the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act,
the already broad use of MTBE increased to help emissions conform
to those regulations.161 However, growing concerns about MTBE
contamination of groundwater resulted in state restrictions and
outright bans in the early 2000s, and a federal repeal of sections of
the CAA, which had prompted the increase of MTBE use in
gasoline.162 Ultimately, gasoline refiners eliminated their use of
MTBE by 2006.163 MTBE litigation began with individual plaintiffs
suing for well contamination and eventually evolved to include
claims by municipalities, water suppliers, and state sovereigns.164
B. Potential Causes of Action
1. Product Liability: Defective Design & Failure to Warn
Plaintiffs injured by a product can assert a strict liability
claim that there was a defect in the way the product was designed or
manufactured, or that the manufacturer failed to warn consumers
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that its product was dangerous.165 A product liability claim typically
requires the paradigmatic negligence elements of duty, breach,
damage, and proximate cause.166 This cause of action focuses on the
knowledge, actions, or inactions of a manufacturer rather than the
on product itself.167
Under a product liability theory, tribal plaintiffs could allege
that Monsanto bears liability for failing to warn consumers and the
public of its unreasonably dangerous products containing PCBs.
Plaintiffs can argue that Monsanto had a duty to warn the public
about the dangers posed by PCBs as soon as it gained such
knowledge. Jurisdictions differ significantly in regard to the
elements of product liability.
Some courts have found a continuing duty to guard against
product defects post-sale in cases involving safety equipment,168
industrial machinery,169 and oil circuit breakers.170 Other courts take
the stance that the product must have been defective at the time it
left the manufacturer’s hands.171 Several jurisdictions use a utilityrisk balancing test: the risks inherent in a product are balanced
against the societal utility of the product.172 Another type of productliability test looks to the adequacy of warnings given by a
manufacturer for an inherently unsafe product.173 Finally, in some
jurisdictions, products liability claims based on failure to warn are
properly sounded in the tort of negligence.174
2. Public Nuisance
Common law provided the first means of attempting to
control environmental pollution: tort claims alleging environmental
165
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pollution as a cause of action can be traced back to at least as early
as the seventeenth century, where odor from a defendant’s hog lot
was found to be a nuisance.175 In modern times, nuisance theory
was endorsed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts to address
environmental harm.176 A public nuisance is one that unreasonably
interferes with a right held by the general public and includes the
consideration of whether such interference affected public health
and safety, whether the conduct was illegal, and whether the
effects of the interference are long-term or permanent.177
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C identifies who
can bring suit under a public nuisance theory.178 Many states have
adopted the Restatement, but the law of public nuisance remains
fairly nebulous and undefined. That ambiguity is one reason public
nuisance has been an attractive cause of action for litigants seeking
to hold manufacturers of hazardous products responsible for the
harms they cause. Public nuisance claims have been raised against
the manufacturers of guns, opiates, tobacco, lead paint, and asbestos,
with mixed results.179
The elements of public nuisance in many jurisdictions also
require that the defendant acted negligently or intentionally in
creating the public nuisance. For example, under New York law, a
plaintiff alleging public nuisance must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following: 1) a public nuisance exists; 2)
negligent or intentional conduct by the defendant created the public
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nuisance; and 3) particular harm suffered by the plaintiff is
dissimilar the harm suffered by the community at large.180
3. Medical Monitoring
Medical monitoring, a type of toxic tort, is a cause of action
that pursues damages resulting from exposure to a harmful
substance.181 Traditional toxic tort plaintiffs must prove that the
substance was toxic, and that they were exposed to an extent
sufficient to cause harm.182 In contrast, a medical monitoring claim
posits that the plaintiff has a substantial risk of developing a serious
disease due to their exposure and therefore, they should be
compensated for the costs of conducting future tests to ensure early
detection of the disease.183 Medical monitoring can be brought as
its own cause of action, or as a remedy pursuant to damages from
another tort action.184 Medical monitoring claims by sovereigns, as
well as municipal health organizations, have seen recent success in
various districts as a stand-alone tort claim.185
4. Negligence
Negligence is a classic tort theory often alleged in
conjunction with other causes of action in a toxic tort suit.186
Although negligence actions typically require a higher level of proof
than strict liability claims, they also allow plaintiffs to make broad
allegations that the defendants engaged in tortious conduct by
180
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failing to exercise reasonable care in their conduct.187 The elements
of negligence are: (1) a duty to protect others from unreasonable
risk; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between breach
and injury that resulted, and; (4) actual injury or damage.188 In a
toxic tort, one obstacle plaintiffs often face is demonstrating the
defendant knew or should have known of the hazardous nature of
the product at the time the product was manufactured and sold, or at
the time of exposure.189
IV.

STANDING ISSUES: PROPRIETARY V. PARENS PATRIAE

A. Overview of Standing
Tribes attempting to sue Monsanto for PCB contamination
can expect to have their standing challenged in a motion to dismiss.
Standing is a jurisdictional concept that asks whether the person or
entity seeking relief has a right to do so, and if the court has proper
jurisdiction to grant such relief.190
Courts must make a determination of standing and
jurisdiction before moving on to substantive issues, making standing
a threshold issue tribes must overcome to advance any litigation. In
Federal Court, the Rules of Civil Procedure and the jurisprudence
interpreting them call for a liberal pleading standard; courts should
assume that the plaintiff’s factual assertions are true and make
inferences in the plaintiff's favor.191 The essential inquiry is whether
the petition has stated a legitimate claim for relief, and whether that
claim is supported by facts that can support all the elements required
to prove each cause of action.192
The paradigmatic elucidation of standing appears in Alfred
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez.193 Subsequent
cases have added additional layers to standing analysis, culminating
187
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in what is sometimes referred to as the Lujan test.194 In determining
standing, federal courts use a three-pronged test. The requirements
are as follows: 1) the plaintiff must have experienced an injury in
fact that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent,”
but “not conjectural or hypothetical”; 2) “there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court”; and 3) “it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be ‘redressed by
a favorable decision.”195 However, as many commentators have
noted, since its inception in the 1970’s, the tripartite Lujan test for
standing - injury in fact, causation, and redressability – has been
plagued by “inconsistenc[y], unreliability, and inordinate
complexity.”196
Despite, or perhaps because of the ambiguity of the standing
doctrine, various courts have allowed sovereigns to assert public
nuisance and product liability claims in either their proprietary or
parens patriae capacities.197 States have successfully asserted their
standing to sue the producers of pollutants such as MTBE198 and

194

Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, supra note 191.
Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, supra note 191 at 560–561 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
196
3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.1, at 1107
(4th ed. 2002); See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93
TEX. L. REV. 1061 (2015); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3,
at 57 (2003) (“The Court has not consistently articulated a test for standing;
different opinions have announced varying formulations for the requirements for
standing in federal court.”); Robert A. Weinstock, The Lorax State: Parens
Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 814
(discussing how Massachusetts v. EPA “left scholars befuddled and lower courts
without instruction”).
197
Compare Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962–965 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 8, 1997) (upholding state’s parens patriae standing to assert product
liability claims against tobacco manufacturers to recover Medicaid. expenses
incurred due to citizens’ personal injuries or death); and Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 280 Ga. 420, 423 (2006) (stating that punitive damages
in products liability case against tobacco manufacturers were brought in state’s
parens patriae capacity) with State v. Philip Morris, USA, Inc., 713 N.W.2d 350
(Minn. 2006) (referencing the state’s entry into a settlement agreement in its
proprietary capacity for recovery of tobacco-related health care costs).
198
See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Litig., 457 F. Supp.
2d 455, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
195

24

sewage,199 products such as tobacco200 and opioids,201 and against
Monsanto itself for PCB contamination.202
B. Proprietary Standing
Proprietary standing allows sovereigns to sue like a private
party for concrete or particularized injuries to their property
rights.203 Snapp provides the rough contours of a state’s proprietary
interests:
[L]ike other associations and private parties, a State
is bound to have a variety of proprietary interests. A
State may, for example, own land or participate in a
business venture. As a proprietor, it is likely to have
the same interests as other similarly situated
proprietors. And like other such proprietors it may at
times need to pursue those interests in court interests
in court.204
Thus, proprietary standing is readily found when an injury to a
traditional property right is alleged.205 Abstract claims relating to
asserting an injury to the environment have also been upheld.206
Tribes in the Pacific Northwest have a proprietary interest in
the ability to safely use their land. In the State of Washington, for
example, tribes could file tort claims in their proprietary capacity
because Washington law considers “whatever is injurious to health
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to essentially
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property” an

199

See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962–965 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 8,
1997).
201
See In re Opioid. Litig., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2428 (S. Ct. N.Y. 2018)
202
State of Ohio v. Monsanto Co., et al., Case No. A 18 01237, Entry Denying
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Sept. 18, 2018) (attached as Exhibit 2) (finding
that the State had parens patriae standing to assert claims against Monsanto
for defective design, failure to warn, negligence, public nuisance, trespass and
unjust enrichment).
203
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592
(1982).
204
Id. at 601–02.
205
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531.4 (3d ed.)
206
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 129 (2009) (harm to
“recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the plaintiff” supports
standing); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laid. Law Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–184 (2000).
200

25

actionable nuisance.207 For a nuisance claim, anyone who has been
“injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the
nuisance” is able to bring suit.208
The exact parameters of a sovereign’s proprietary interests
are unclear and evolving.209 Professor Seth Davis has identified five
areas where states may have a proprietary interest: ownership of
land or participation in a business venture; corporate interests;
financial interests; common law interests; and private law
interests.210 However, the proprietary interests of states are not
wholly analogous to those of Native American tribes, because tribes
have unique property rights as a result of treaties, executive orders,
and doctrines such as the federal trust.211 Of special importance to
PCB litigation are the varying proprietary interests tribes possess in
regards to hunting, fishing, and gathering, collectively known as
usufructuary property rights.212
For example, Pacific Northwest tribes who are signatories to
what are now known as the “Stevens Treaties”213 have a right to the
“taking [of] fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and
stations."214 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
such treaty provisions enumerate tribal property rights.215
Furthermore, tribes and scholars have oft argued that treaty fishing
rights include an implied right of habitat protection.216 The Ninth
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Circuit held in United States v. Washington (“The Culverts Case”)
that the Stevens Treaties included the following:
That is, even in the absence of an explicit promise,
we would infer a promise that the number of fish
would always be sufficient to provide a "moderate
living" to the Tribes. Just as the land on the Belknap
Reservation would have been worthless without
water to irrigate the arid land, and just as the right to
hunt and fish on the Klamath Marsh would have been
worthless without water to provide habitat for game
and fish, the Tribes' right of access to their usual and
accustomed fishing places would be worthless
without harvestable fish.217
As a corollary, tribal treaty fishing, hunting, and gathering rights are
rendered worthless if those resources are too contaminated by PCBs
to be safely harvested and consumed. An implied treaty right to fish
and game which are safe to consume is logically consistent with the
rationale of The Culverts Case, and the spirit of the Stevens Treaties.
Thus, many tribes have proprietary rights, particularly in
regards to hunting, fishing, and gathering, enabling them to sue
those responsible for interfering with the use of their property, such
as when corporations like Monsanto cause widespread toxic
contamination on tribal land.
C. Parens Patriae Standing
Historically, parens patriae was a common law doctrine
allowing sovereigns to protect citizens who are not legally able to
act for themselves.218 In modern times, the parens patriae doctrine
has been expanded to include quasi-sovereign interests, which
encompass the health and well-being of citizens.219 State courts
typically adhere to the same principles as federal courts regarding
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parens patriae standing, and often rely on federal precedent.220 The
starting point for a modern parens patriae standing analysis is
Snapp.221
In order to establish standing, a sovereign must: 1) “articulate an
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the
State must be more than a nominal party”; 2) “express a quasisovereign interest”: and 3) “allege an injury to a sufficiently
substantial segment of its population.”222 The Snapp court
characterized two general categories of quasi-sovereign interests:
“First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and
well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in
general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not
being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the
federal system.”
Eschewing “an exhaustive formal definition” or “definitive list
of qualifying [quasi-sovereign] interests” the Supreme Court
emphasized such rights “must be sufficiently concrete to create an
actual controversy between the State and the defendant. The
vagueness of this concept can only be resolved by turning to the
facts of individual cases.”223
Some courts have correctly recognized the extent of tribal
quasi-sovereign interests. For example, in Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Florida v. U.S, the Court properly recognized the quasisovereign interests of the tribe:
“The Miccosukee Tribe’s interest in its ability to preserve its
culture and way of life is a paradigmatic example of an
interest that goes beyond a proprietary or private interest,
and affects the general well-being of a sufficiently
substantial segment of Tribe members.”224
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The insidious trend followed by many courts, however, is to
hold tribes to different, more arduous standard than applied to other
sovereigns.225 Specifically, some courts have held that tribes must
allege an injury to every single member of their people in order to
establish parens patriae standing.226
One fraught aspect of standing law complicating any tribal
assertion of its quasi-sovereign interests is the relationship between
the modern tripartite Lujan test for standing – injury, causation,
and redressability – and the parens patriae doctrine itself. The
parens patriae doctrine was formulated in a series of cases from
the early 20th centuries which predate the Lujan test for standing.227
Later, in 1982, well after the modern tripartite standing test was
formulated, the Supreme Court found that the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico had parens patriae standing to bring a suit against
apple growers in Virginia for discrimination against Puerto Rican
workers and the subsequent injury to Puerto Rico’s economy.228
Importantly, the Court in Snapp did not even mention the tripartite
standing test: it held that Puerto Rico has standing because is
articulated a valid quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its citizens
from discrimination.229 Based on Snapp and other jurisprudence,
some scholars argue that showing a quasi-sovereign interest under
the parens patriae doctrine is an alternative method of establishing
standing.230 They argue that the modern tripartite standing test is
simply not applicable in such situations.231
Another convoluted and inconsistent aspect of standing law
stems from the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.232 There,
225
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the State of Massachusetts petitioned for a review of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s denial of a petition for
rulemaking that would regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant
to the Clean Air Act.233 The deeply divided Court discussed both
parens patriae doctrine, and the Lujan test, but its standing analysis
suffers from significant ambiguity at best, and downright
contradiction at worst.234 Specifically, the Court implied that the
State of Massachusetts had met the modern standing requirements,
but the Court also emphasized that “the Commonwealth is entitled
to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”235 Massachusetts v.
EPA suggests that sovereigns may be entitled to sue based solely on
their quasi-sovereign interests, regardless of whether they meet the
strict standing requirements elucidated in the Lujan test.236 This
view aligns with the Court’s decision in Snapp holding that Puerto
Rico had parens patriae standing because “it has a claim to represent
its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as strong as that
of any State.”237
For Native American tribes, PCB in the water, fish, animals,
and the physical bodies of tribal members themselves implicates a
quasi-sovereign interest: it is an injury to tribal members’ health,
safety, and wellbeing. Thus, PCB contamination gives rise to a
tribe’s parens patriae interest. Similar tribal interests have been
recently upheld in opioid litigation, where courts have recognized a
tribal parens patriae interest that goes beyond the deaths it continues
to cause; tribal interest lies in the “broad societal, health, and
economic concerns arising from the pervasive presence of illegal
opioids in the Nation's communities.”238
For tribes in the Pacific Northwest, the cultural, religious,
and dietary significance of salmon also gives rise to a parens patriae
interest in salmon and other marine resources because the
deprivation of the ability to safely consume fish impacts a tribe’s
233
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ability to practice its culture and traditions.239 Based on those and
other factors, tribes should be able to establish parens patriae
standing by alleging that the health, safety, way of life, and culture
of the tribe are at risk due to the actions of Monsanto.
V.

CURRENT LITIGATION AGAINST MONSANTO

One tribal plaintiff, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (SRMT), is
currently pursuing claims against Monsanto for PCB contamination
based on tort theories.240 Additionally, many state Attorneys
General (herein AG or AGs) are currently engaged in litigation,
including those from New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and
Washington.241 Recently, the State of Washington settled a suit with
Monsanto over PCB contamination for $95 million.242 The
Washington AG brought suit in its parens patriae capacity pursuing
damages on behalf of itself and all state residents for injuries to the
state’s public natural resources, including a loss of economic
value.243 Cities and other municipal bodies are also pursuing PCB
contamination claims against Monsanto.244 At least ten cities,
including Los Angeles, Baltimore, Seattle, Tacoma, San Diego and
San Jose have sued Monsanto on theories of public nuisance.245
A. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe
The St. Regis Mohawk Tribe is a federally recognized
Native American tribe that has lived along the St. Lawrence River
239

See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. U.S., 680 F. Supp. 2d 1308,
1315 (2010) (“The Miccosukee Tribe’s interest in its ability to preserve its
culture and way of life is a paradigmatic example of an interest that goes beyond
a proprietary or private interest, and affects the general well-being of a
sufficiently substantial segment of Tribe members. Accordingly, the Miccosukee
Tribe’s equal protection claim alleges a quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to
support parens patriae standing as to its equal protection claim.”).
240
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition, Back v. Monsanto, No. 18SL-CC03530
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 2020).
241
Washington v. Monsanto, No. 16-2-29591-6 (King Co. Super. Ct. Dec. 16,
2016).
242
Monsanto to Pay Record $95 Million to End Ferguson’s Lawsuit Over PCBs,
WASHINGTON ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE (Jun 24, 2020)
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/monsanto-pay-record-95-millionend-ferguson-s-lawsuit-over-pcbs.
243
See Complaint, Washington v. Monsanto, No. 16-2-29591-6 (King Co.
Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2016).
244
See e.g., City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2:15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016
WL 6275164 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2016).
245
Id.

31

in northern New York for eons.246 The SRMT is part of a larger
Mohawk community, the Akwesasne, that includes the Saint Regis
Mohawk Reservation located in the United States, and the
Akwesasne Mohawk Reserve located in Canada.247 Akwesasne,
which means “land where the partridge drums,” is located at the
confluence of the Saint Lawrence, Saint Regis, Raquette, Grasse,
and Salmon Rivers.248 For generations, the SRMT has availed itself
of the abundant fish and wildlife and rich alluvial soils of its
homeland,249 as well as trapping and gathering of plants for use as
medicine and for weaving traditional baskets.250
Beginning in the 1700s, and continuing today, non-native
industries have been polluting Akwesasne, resulting in massive
negative impacts on the SRMT, tribal members, and their
homeland.251 Beginning in the mid-20th century, the environmental
pollution caused by several industries located on the St. Lawrence
river adjacent to Akwesasne essentially destroyed the ability of
tribal members to safely fish, trap, or pursue husbandry activities.252
Today, “Akwesasne is downwind, downriver, and down
gradient from one federal and two state Superfund sites, one of
which, the General Motors plant, has been determined to be a serious
hazardous waste site.”253 From 1969 to 1974, the General Motors
plant used PCBs manufactured and sold by Monsanto.254 Those
PCBs now contaminate the waters, sediment, fish, and other organic
life on the reservation.255 Additionally, elevated levels of PCBs are
present in the five individually named plaintiffs, all members of the
SRMT who resided for an extended period of time in Akwesasne.256
Each of the individually named plaintiffs in the SRMT suit suffer
from ailments associated with exposure to PCBs.257
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The SRMT filed suit against Monsanto and its spin-off
companies in the Missouri Circuit Court, 21st Judicial District,
located in St. Louis, Missouri. The SRMT brought claims in its
proprietary capacity and in its parens patriae capacity.258 The
petition also names five individual plaintiffs, but the petition and
supporting memoranda are careful to clarify that the SRMT is not
asserting claims on behalf of any individuals; the five individual
tribal members are suing to recover individual damages separate
from the tribe.259 The SRMT asserted claims for strict liability under
both New York and Missouri law based on product liability theories
of design defect, ultrahazardous condition, and failure to warn.
Additionally, the Tribe asserted causes of action for negligence,
medical monitoring, public nuisance, and unjust enrichment.260
In its motion to dismiss the SRMT’s Second Amended
Petition, Monsanto argued that the SRMT lacked both proprietary
and parens patriae standing to assert product liability and public
nuisance claims against Monsanto.261 The core of Monsanto’s
argument is that SRMT only asserts personal injuries suffered by
tribal members.262 According to Monsanto, the parens patriae
claims by SRMT are nothing more than the individual tribal member
claims masquerading as parens patriae claims.263 Monsanto argued
that the Tribe lacks any standing to bring personal injury claims of
its individual members.
Importantly, SRMT makes both types of claims in its
Second Amended Petition, bringing “action in both its proprietary
capacity for the damages it has itself sustained, as well as in its
parens patriae [sic] capacity for the damages it has incurred and will
incur in protecting the health, safety and welfare of Tribal
members.”264 Later in the petition, each discrete cause of action is
bought separately, first on behalf of individual plaintiffs and then on
behalf of the SRMT.265
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On April 1, 2019, the Circuit Court for the County of St.
Louis granted Monsanto’s Motion to Dismiss as to all of the
SRMT’s proprietary claims except as to the claims of public
nuisance and unjust enrichment.266 The Court held that the SRMT
had individual standing to proceed on its public nuisance claim
because the Tribe had a proprietary interest in its "traditional rights
to hunt and fish which include rights to game and fish that are safe
for consumption ... [which] have all been severely impacted or
restricted’ on the Tribe's current Reservation.”267
The court denied Monsanto's motion to dismiss as to the
claims brought in the SRMT’s parents patriae capacity. The court
relied on Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez268
to draw a distinction between the quasi-sovereign interests
implicated by the product liability, negligence, and medical
monitoring claims and the proprietary interests implicated by the
public nuisance claim. Quasi-sovereign interests, as explained by
the circuit court, include the Tribe’s “parens patriae interest in the
Tribe’s political and cultural integrity”; “the emotional state, wellbeing and mental health of tribal members''; “the Tribe’s public
health, its culture and its way of life”; and Tribal members’
“economic [well-being], health, safety and welfare.”269
The Court also allowed the SRMT’s unjust enrichment claim
to move forward, rejecting Monsanto’s argument that the Tribe
failed to plead an essential element of unjust enrichment, and
finding that the SRMT sufficiently alleged that they incurred costs
associated with the PCB contamination. 270
Following the Court’s order dismissing parts of the Second
Amended Petition, the SRMT repeatedly emphasized that the Tribe
does not seek damages on behalf of any individually named
plaintiffs.271 In its brief in opposition to Monsanto’s motion to
dismiss, the SRMT reiterated that “the tribe does not seek damages
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for any individual tribe member or unnamed party.”272 The Tribe’s
position is that the proper time to calculate and dispense damages is
post-trial.273
Next, the parties entered the discovery phase of litigation. In
response to Monsanto’s first set of interrogatories, the SRMT
detailed the specific damages it suffered as follows: economic
damages to public health in the amount of $150,000,000;
environmental damage in the amount of $2,150,100,000; natural
resource damages in the amount of $580,992,100; and damages to
its culture and way of life in the amount of $105,019,200.274
The SRMT estimates its past medical costs to be $50 million
275
dollars. Thus far, a critical point of contention between SRMT
and Monsanto has occurred over the production of medical records
related to the SRMT’s claim of past medical expenditures.276 SRMT
based its preliminary estimate of past medical costs on fifty-nine
living and forty-five deceased Tribal members. These members
were diagnosed at the SRMT clinic with Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma,
malignant melanoma, and breast cancer.277 Those three diseases
have all been found by the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC) to be caused by PCBs.278 The SRMT further
identified 281 living and 138 deceased members of the Tribe
diagnosed with cardiovascular disease, which they assert is
associated with exposure to PCBs.279 The SRMT estimated, based
on a review of a representative patient’s record, that it spends over
$100,000 per patient suffering from one of the aforementioned
diseases after accounting for treatment paid for by private insurance,
Medicare, or Medicaid.280
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Furthermore, the SRMT estimates that it will incur future
medical costs in the amount of $93 million.281 That estimate is based
on extensive blood sampling of 703 adult tribal members to
determine the level of PCBs contained in their blood.282 Over 75%
of the study group had high levels of PCB congeners known to cause
one or more of the three types of cancers previously mentioned.283
In coming to its future medical damages figure, the SRMT
extrapolated the blood sample data to determine the number of
Tribal members who would participate in a medical monitoring
program designed to ameliorate harm from PCB exposure,
concluding that of the SRMT’s 7,714 members, about 5,862 likely
had similarly high levels of PCBs in their blood.284
The SRMT did not, however, assert that PCB exposure
necessarily caused all the Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, malignant
melanoma, breast cancer, and cardiovascular disease found in Tribal
members.285 Rather, the SRMT proposes to prove its past and future
medical expenditures using statistical analysis and aggregate
evidence.286 In contrast, Monsanto’s interrogatories and its motion
to compel argue for a different approach: litigating the causation and
damages based on a review of the complete medical records and
history of all 814 Tribal member identified by the SRMT as having
suffered from cardiovascular disease, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma,
malignant melanoma, and breast cancer.287
The litigation’s discovery phase was still ongoing as of late
288
2021. During this phase, Monsanto has repeatedly asked and
received continuances as it seeks to compel the SRMT to disclose
information including: the SRMT’s membership database; the
Tribe’s Brownfields Database; and the Medical and Non-Medical
Record Data Held by the Tribe’s Medical Clinic.289 In April of
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2021, Monsanto went so far as to use the rules of discovery to
conduct property inspections of the Akwensanse community.290
Additionally, Monsanto filed a motion to sever the claims of
the individually named plaintiffs from the claims of the SRMT.291
In a vindication of the SRMT’s position that the individual and tribal
claims were interrelated, the court denied Monsanto’s motion to
sever.292 The court found that“[t]he devolvement, discharge,
dangers, and damages caused by PCBs (and Defendants alleged
knowledge and involvement in same) constitute and comprise a
series of transactions or occurrences based on questions of law and
fact common to both the individual Plaintiffs and those of the
Tribe.”293 This litigation is ongoing as of the writing of this article.
B. State of Washington
Washington was the first state to sue Monsanto over PCB
contamination.294 In December of 2016, the Washington State
Attorney General filed its original complaint against Monsanto in
the King County Superior Court of the State of Washington.295 That
complaint alleged that Monsanto was responsible for PCB
contamination in Washington’s “bays, oceans, rivers, streams, soil,
and air.”296 The Washington complaint points out that PCB
contamination is global, and that PCBs “have been detected in the
tissues of every single species tested, including marine life, various
animals and birds, plants, and trees, and humans.”297
Washington’s complaint included the following causes of
action: public nuisance, products liability - failure to warn, defective
design - negligence, and statutory trespass.298 The Washington
290
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complaint is careful to include an equitable indemnity cause of
action regarding the PCB contamination of the Lower Duwamish
river that is currently being remediated.299
Monsanto sought to remove the suit to federal court based
on two theories. First, Monsanto argued that it had been “acting
under color of an officer or agency of the United States” and a
federal court, therefore, had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C
1442(a)(1).300 Second, Monsanto argued that the federal district
court had jurisdiction under 28 USC 1331 and Art. I, section 8,
clause 17 of the US constitution, because the claims “arise, in part,
on federal enclaves and under federal laws”301
Monsanto argued that it manufactured PCBs in close
collaboration with the US Government and was therefore acting as
an agent of the United States when it produced and sold PCBs.302 In
support of this assertion, Monsanto points to a long history,
beginning in the World War II era, where the US military relied on
PCBs produced by Monsanto.303 Monsanto claimed that most of the
PCBs produced in that era were “for use by” the US military.”304
Monsanto also points to the “Necessity Certificates” issued to them
by the Federal Government during WWII as evidence that it acted
as a US agent.305 For the time period following WWII, Monsanto
argued that the US military continued to rely on PCBs to an extent
justifying the invocation of federal officer jurisdiction.
Furthermore, Monsanto claims that, despite deciding to stop the
production of PCBs for various uses in 1970, the federal government
directed Monsanto to continue producing PCBs under section 101
of the Defense Production Act of 1950.306
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington entered an order granting the State of Washington’s
motion to remand in July 2017.307 The US District Court relied on a
test promulgated by the Ninth Circuit in remanding this case to state
court.308 In the Ninth Circuit, a defendant may invoke federal officer
299
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jurisdiction under the following circumstances: (1) it is a “person”
within the meaning of the statute; (2) a causal nexus exists between
the plaintiff’s claims and the actions the entity took pursuant to a
federal officer’s direction; and (3) it has a colorable federal defense
to the plaintiff’s claims. In pointed language, the Court found that
Monsanto failed to show that its actions of producing PCBs, and
subsequently concealing their toxicity, were done under the
direction of a federal officer. 309
The district court rejected Monsanto’s arguments and
remanded the case to state court. Regarding the claim that Monsanto
acted as a federal officer, the court noted that although the Supreme
Court has suggested that it may be possible for a private contractor
to invoke federal officer jurisdiction if they are “helping the
Government to produce an item that it needs,” it has not specified
“whether and when particular circumstances may enable private
contractors to invoke the statute.”310
In 2020, the State of Washington settled its suit with
Monsanto for $95 million.311 Approximately $21.25 million of the
settlement will be paid in contingency fees to the outside firms of
Baron & Budd and Harrigan Leyh Farmer & Thomsen.312
C. City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co.
On January 25, 2016, the City of Seattle (Seattle) filed a
complaint against Monsanto in the District Court for the Western
District of Washington.313 The complaint asserted the following
claims against Monsanto: public nuisance, defective design, failure
to warn, negligence, and equitable indemnity.314 Those claims were
based on the presence of PCBs in Seattle’s drainage systems,
stormwater and water bodies.315
Monsanto filed a motion to dismiss on May 18, 2016, and
the Court subsequently dismissed Seattle’s claims of defective
design, failure to warn, and equitable indemnity but allowed Seattle
to proceed with its public nuisance and negligence claims.316 On
309
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March 24, 2017, Monsanto filed an answer to Seattle’s first
amended complaint and counterclaims against Seattle.317
1. Order on Motion to Dismiss
In its motion to dismiss, Monsanto argued that all of
Seattle’s claims were preempted by Washington’s Product Liability
Act (WPLA) which preempts most product-related common-law
torts except those based on fraud, intentionally caused harm, or
claims under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act.318
The court found that Seattle’s negligence claim and product
liability claims of failure to warn and defective design were
grounded in common law, and thus fell under the WPLA’s
definition of “product liability claim[s]”.319 Additionally, because
the WPLA only preempts claims arising after 1981,320 and Seattle’s
claims were grounded on Monsanto’s conduct prior to 1979 (when
the Toxic Substances Control Act was enacted), the court found that
none of Seattle’s claims, including negligence and product liability,
were preempted by the WPLA.321
2. Statute of Limitations
Monsanto also argued that Seattle’s claims were
barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.322 The court rejected
that argument because it found that Seattle brought suit for the
benefit of the state and thus the actions “arise out of the exercise of
powers traceable to the sovereign powers of the state which have
been delegated to the municipality.”323 The court distinguished
proprietary municipal actions - operating a city drainage system,324
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contracting for the production of electricity,325 and declaring a
public health emergency due to contaminated drinking water326 from sovereign municipal actions -- administering a public school
system327, and leasing property for log yards.328 The court held that
Seattle was acting in its sovereign capacity when it sued to restore
the purity of its waterways.329 Specifically, Seattle was authorized
by statute to prevent “the defilement or pollution of all streams
running through or into its corporate limits,” and to “declare what
shall be a nuisance, and to abate the same.”330 However, the court
found that Seattle’s equitable indemnity claim did not promote the
public welfare and was therefore susceptible to the statute of
limitations.331
3. Public Nuisance
Seattle’s public nuisance cause of action was based on
Washington’s statutory scheme, which defines an “actionable
nuisance” as anything “injurious to health” that “obstruct[s] the free
use of property, so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of the life and property.”332 Under Washington law, any
act that “obstructs or tends to obstruct” or “render[s] dangerous for
passage, any lake or navigable river, bay, stream, canal or basin,” is
a nuisance.333 Washington law further defines a “public nuisance”
as “one which affects equally the rights of an entire community or
neighborhood, although the extent of the damage may be
unequal.”334 Additionally, it is a public nuisance to “in any manner
. . . corrupt or render unwholesome or impure the water of any such
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spring, stream, pond, lake, or well, to the injury or prejudice of
others.”335
Monsanto’s motion to dismiss Seattle’s public nuisance cause of
action argued that Seattle lacked standing and failed to establish
proximate causation.336 The court rejected Monsanto’s arguments.
First, in regard to standing, the court noted that Seattle does not need
to own the contaminated water to bring a public nuisance claim
because Seattle was injured financially by the toxic
contamination.337 Second, the court rejected Monsanto’s argument
that Seattle could not bring a public nuisance claim for the East and
Lower Duwamish Waterways because they do not have a property
interest in those bodies of water. The court found that the statutory
language and corresponding jurisprudence gave Seattle a “special
interest” in the public land in question because Seattle owns
property abutting that land.338 Thus, the court found that Seattle had
suffered an injury pursuant to RCW 7.48.020, as well as a “special
injury” pursuant to RCW 7.48.210.339
4. Product Liability
Although the court denied Monsanto’s motion to dismiss on the
previously mentioned causes of action, it granted the motion as to
Seattle’s product liability claims.340 Under Washington law, to
succeed on a strict liability - defective design - claim, a plaintiff
must show: “(1) a defect existed in the product when it left
Monsanto’s hands; (2) the defect was unknown to the consumer or
user; (3) the defect rendered the product’s intended use
unreasonably dangerous; and (4) the defect proximately caused
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Seattle’s injury.”341 Regarding failure to warn, a plaintiff must show
that a product without a manufacturing defect is still unreasonably
dangerous in the hands of the user absent adequate warnings.342 The
court reasoned that Seattle did not properly allege that it was a
“user” or “consumer” of Monsanto’s product, and refused to impose
strict liability based on Seattle’s argument that it was a “foreseeable
bystander.”343
Finally, the court found that Seattle plead sufficient facts to
properly allege a nuisance claim.344 Specifically, Seattle alleged
facts suggesting that Monsanto “owed Seattle a duty to avert
foreseeable financial loss due to environmental damage caused by
Monsanto’s chemicals.”345
5. Counterclaims
Subsequently, Monsanto brought six counterclaims and
asserted ninety affirmative defenses.346 Monsanto’s counterclaims
against Seattle are based on the discharge of pollutants into the
Duwamish River, the East Waterway, the West Waterway, Elliott
Bay, Puget Sound and Lake Washington (“Affected Water
Bodies”).347 The counterclaims include: 1) a CERCLA claim for the
recovery of costs incurred investigating and remediating pollutants
released by Seattle; 2) a claim for declaratory relief under CERCLA
and the Declaratory Judgment Act stating that Seattle is jointly and
severally liable to Monsanto for future clean-up costs; 3) claims that
Seattle violated the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Permits and portions of the Clean Water Act
resulting in injury to Monsanto; 4) a negligence claim; 5) an unjust
enrichment claim; and 6) a contribution claim.348
6. Clean Water Act (CWA)
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Seattle argued to the District Court that Monsanto failed to
plead sufficient facts demonstrating that it has standing for each
counterclaim they brought. Seattle argued that Monsanto lacked
standing for its CWA counterclaims because it failed to demonstrate
injury in-fact, causation, and redressability.349
The District Court discussed the elements of standing,
including injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. Monsanto’s
central claim was that Seattle, through the operation of its sewage
and stormwater systems, was responsible for discharging pollutants
into bodies of water. Although the Court recognized that Monsanto's
generalized allegations were not ideal, it held they were sufficiently
pled under the Lujan standard.350
The court then considered Monsanto’s argument that it had
suffered injuries, including contingent liabilities, response costs,
and defense costs.351 First, according to Monsanto, contingent
liability arises from the fact that Monsanto was not only subject to
multiple contemporaneous suits by State and local authorities, but
also faced future regulatory actions by Federal, State, or local
actors.352 The Court rejected those arguments, stating that the
injuries alleged by Monsanto were conjectural or hypothetical and
not actual or imminent.353 However, the court did find that
Monsanto pled sufficient facts to show that it incurred costs under
the CERCLA clean-up process in the Lower Duwamish, including
costs from an analysis of Seattle’s drainage basins.354
The court rejected Monsanto’s causation claim that Seattle
caused Monsanto’s injuries by discharging pollutants into the
surrounding bodies of water.355 Specifically, Monsanto argued that
Seattle’s non-compliance with the CWA resulted in the EPA
determining that Monsanto was a Potentially Responsible Party
under CERCLA, which in turn prompted the State of Washington to
sue.356 In rejecting Monsanto’s chain of causation arguments, the
court noted that the EPA and the State of Washington made
independent decisions to take action against Monsanto.357
349
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Furthermore, the court pointed out that Monsanto’s actions of
producing PCBs occurred long before any alleged CWA violations
by Seattle.358
Regarding redressability, Monsanto argued that an
injunction enjoining Seattle from violating the CWA and requiring
Seattle to remediate its stormwater discharges would satisfy that
prong.359 The court soundly rejected that argument, reasoning that
1) any civil penalties would be paid to the US, not Monsanto; 2) an
injunction or civil penalty would not redress Monsanto’s future
defense cost and contingent liabilities; and 3) Monsanto's “future
response costs, in so far as they are incurred as a consequence of
Seattle's activities, can be recovered through cost recovery or
contribution under CERCLA.”360 Unlike Monsanto’s CWA
counterclaims, the court found that Monsanto’s CERCLA
counterclaim was properly pled.361
7. Settlement Talks
In 2020 and continuing into 2021, Monsanto entered
controversial settlement negotiations seeking to certify a class action
settlement for approximately 2,500 cities, counties and ports
affected by PCB contamination.362 Those settlement talks have
repeatedly failed to win approval, in part because of concerns that
they impede the ability of other injured parties, such as states, to file
PCB related claims.363 The City of Seattle has strenuously objected
to the proposed settlement:
The City considers the proposed Settlement to be a gift to
Monsanto and its new parent company, Bayer. The
Settlement would allow them to close the books on
358
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enormous liability arising from Monsanto’s production and
sale of PCBs. The proposed settlement, in the City’s view, is
a Trojan Horse for many of the class members, providing
them a pittance to monitor their stormwater for PCBs and
blocking them from getting funds they will need if PCBs are
found.364
Notably, Monsanto did not did not invite SRMT to participate in
these global settlement discussions.
VI.

TRIBAL ISSUES

A. PCB Contamination and the Disproportionate
Effects on Native Communities
“My strength is from the fish; my blood is from the fish, from the
roots and berries. The fish and game are the essence of my life.” - Chief Weninock, Yakama, 1915
To the Columbia River Basin Native tribes of the Pacific
Northwest, salmon is more than a food source; it is the foundation
of their culture. These tribes call themselves the Salmon People.365
Salmon was a fundamental aspect of Native economies in the Seattle
area for thousands of years, and impacted the development of trade
routes and commercial fishing in the area.366 Salmon also shaped
tribes’ religious and spiritual practices, as over a dozen longhouses
and churches that were built on tribal land used salmon in their
services.367 Salmon can be seen throughout Native artwork and
appears in many folklores.368 To this day, tribes in the area celebrate
the annual salmon return, as well as the annual salmon ceremony
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where community members welcome the first salmon of the
season.369
Native people consider salmon a “gift of food from the
Creator” and they honor the salmon for the way that it allows
communities to thrive.370 Tribal members believed that salmon were
“immortal humans who live in villages deep under the ocean.”371
When spring arrived, these people would disguise themselves as
salmon and offer themselves to the tribal community as a source of
food.372 Once consumed, the tribes would return the salmon
skeletons to the rivers so that the spirit could return as salmon
people.373 For tribes in the Columbia Basin, this was the cycle of
life. 374
Traditionally, all members of the tribe partook in the
preparation of salmon.375 During the cold winter months, salmon
sustained tribes.376 Men participated in fishing while women and
children prepared the fish to be dried and smoked.377 When Puget
Sound tribal lands were signed over to the US government through
treaties, tribal leaders made sure to explicitly guarantee their people
the right to continue fishing salmon.378
Many tribal members in the present day rely on fishing as
their main source of income, and salmon remains an essential form
of sustenance for tribal members.379 Ultimately, salmon was and
still is an irreplaceable part of indigenous culture in the Pacific
Northwest.380 The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission
describes this deep connection between salmon and tribes by stating:
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“[S]almon and the river they use are part of our sense of
place. The Creator put us here where the salmon return.381
We are obliged to remain and to protect this place.382
Without salmon returning to our rivers and streams, we
would cease to be Indian people.”383
Taking into account theessential nature of salmon to
Washington tribes, PCB contamination in salmon populations are
cause for serious concern.384 For example, the State of Washington
has promulgated fish advisories for its waters, including the Puget
Sound recommending the consumption of no more than 2-3 servings
of Coho, chum, pink, and sockeye salmon per week.385 For chinook
salmon, particularly “Blackmouth Chinook” which reside in the
Puget Sound their entire adult lives, the recommendations are even
more strict, no more than one serving per week and two servings per
month, respectively.386 For many tribal communities, substituting
other food sources for contaminated fish and wildlife is not only
impractical, it is antithetical to their cultural and religious
practices.387 For other tribes, such as the Saint Regis Mohawk, fish
advisories along with visible signs of contamination seen by tribal
members themselves have drastically reduced the amount of local
fish consumption, although many members continue to eat local fish
“because they felt a cultural obligation to do so.”388 In a particularly
brutal catch-22, some SRMT members wonder about the net effect
of substituting PCB contaminated fish, the consumption of which
has been scientifically proven to contribute to diabetes,389 for
381
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processed foods because that dietary shift has resulted in “further
exacerbating chronic, diet-related health problems in the
community, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease”.390
Chinook or King salmon are one of the main sources of food
for Puget Sound tribes.391 One study found that PCB concentrations
in that species were extremely high, causing young salmon to be
immunosuppressed, suffering from DNA damage, and less able to
metabolize toxins.392 This affects adult salmon during their
spawning migration.393 Due to bioaccumulation, concentrations of
PCB can be 2000 to a million times higher in organisms than in the
surrounding waters, with highest amounts of PCBs at the top of the
food chain.394 When salmon are at a point in their life cycle when
they have less lipids, the PCBs in their fat mobilizes to other lipid
containing organs, ultimately affecting their liver, kidneys, and
brain.395
Even without accounting for PCB contamination, Native
communities face disproportionate health and environmental risks
when compared to the average population in North America.396
Native American populations have mortality rates that are higher
than white Americans by 60% and are twice as high as that of the
general US population.
In addition, Native populations are facing disproportionate
consequences of PCB contamination due to their reliance on salmon.
Existing health problems are often compounded by exposure to
different contaminants, like PCBs.397 In Spokane, an aluminum
rolling factory manufactured metal for bombs and planes during
World War II.398 During production, the factory contaminated the
groundwater with PCBs which leached into the Spokane River.399
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The Spokane Tribe relies heavily on fish.400 In fact, members once
consumed 1-2 pounds of fish a day.401 However, due to
contamination, the Washington Department of Health has limited
fish consumption.402 In some areas of the river, the department
recommends that no fish be consumed due to high toxicity.403
On a larger scale, tribes across the continent face serious
health risks from PCB in food sources. For example, the
Aamjiwnaang Tribe near Ontario has suffered from PCB exposure
which has in turn altered the way the tribe is able to practice their
culture, hunt, fish, gather medicine, and perform ceremonies.404
In Alaska, the San Lawrence Island Yupik Tribe has several
abandoned U.S. military sites on their land which contain PCBs.405
This is particularly problematic in the Arctic, because PCBs are
especially persistent and bioaccumulate in the lipid-rich Arctic food
which the Yupik people depend on.406 For example, walruses in this
region can have 193-421 parts per billion (ppb) PCB when the EPA
sets a risk-based limit on fish of 1.5 ppb.407 PCB levels in the
hundreds are very alarming considering the EPA has declared that
levels as low of 1.5 ppb can cause cancer risks.408 Due to high
exposure, Yupik people sampled for a study looking at PCB in blood
serum of Native American populations had PCB levels 4-12 times
higher than the general US population.409 Yupik people also believe
they suffer from higher rates of cancer, thyroid disease, diabetes,
cardiovascular, and other chronic diseases410
Many tribes also suffer from PCB exposure through their air
and water, making these toxins inescapable. The Tewa Pueblo
communities in the southwestern United States have PCB levels
25,000 times higher than the standard for human health and 1000
times higher than the standard for wildlife habitat in Los Alamos
Canyon.411 This is due to the nearby Los Alamos National
400
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Laboratory, which has been releasing toxic waste into the land, air,
and groundwater.412
Finally, the Mohawk Nation at Akwesasne had three
aluminum foundries built upstream of their community.413 The
foundries polluted nearby rivers with hydraulic fluids containing
PCBs.414 In 1986, the St. Regis Mohawk Department of
Environmental Health and Safety issued an advisory that warned
against eating fish from the river in this area.415 Despite this
warning, Mohawk adolescents who were breastfed continue to have
higher PCB levels, and the entire community has higher risk of
“thyroid dysfunction, decrease in cognitive function, elevated risk
of diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and hypertension.”416
Overall, native communities are at higher risk for PCB
contamination due to their cultural relationship to the land and
natural resources.417 The possibility of increased PCB exposure has
deprived tribes of their ability to pass down oral traditions through
fishing and berry picking, medicine gathering, and other activities
involving the environment.418 Rocks can no longer be collected for
sweat lodges due to contamination in streams.419 Cedar used to wash
babies, smudge, and make tea is also heavily polluted.420 “This
contamination threatens not only the health of indigenous
communities, it also infringes on their reproductive rights, including
the ability to impart cultural land-based knowledge to their
children.”421
B. Will Tribes be Treated Differently than Other
Sovereigns?
1. The Court’s Treatment of Tribal Sovereignty
and Standing
Despite sturdy legal underpinnings that ostensibly recognize
tribal sovereignty and the accompanying parens patriae interests,
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courts have often slithered around these doctrines to deny tribes their
substantive and procedural rights.422 At the heart of this issue is
whether Native American tribes are subject to the same standing
analysis as other sovereigns, such as states or commonwealths.
Tribes, like states, have quasi-sovereign interests, but courts have
often refused to treat them as similar entities.
There are a litany of examples of courts refusing to respect
tribal sovereignty through ignoring or misapplying the parens
patriae doctrine.423 Just one year after the Supreme Court upheld
Puerto Rico’s sovereign right to sue in its parens patriae capacity to
uphold the rights of its citizens in Snapp, a federal district court in
Montana ignored Snapp completely, and relied on outdated dicta to
deny Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation their sovereign rights.424 The Assiniboine & Sioux
Tribes court held that the tribe “must be acting on behalf of the
collective interests of all its citizens. Here, the proposed claim is on
behalf only of those Indians seeking refunds because they have been
improperly subjected to these taxes…it can hardly be said that this
lawsuit is on behalf of the interests of the entire Fort Peck
constituency.”425 The district court ignores the clear parens patriae
interest the Tribe has in the economic health of its members, and the
Tribe’s significant interest in protecting all of its citizenry from any
present or future unlawful imposition of taxes. The issue is greater
than the harm suffered by a relatively small proportion of the tribal
members, it subsumes that issue and implicates the tribe’s quasisovereign interests.
The Supreme Court in Snapp specifically addressed this
issue, refusing to deny standing based on the fact that only a
relatively small number of individuals were directly injured:
“Petitioners contend that at most there were only 787 job
opportunities at stake in Virginia and that this number of
temporary jobs could not have a substantial direct or
indirect effect on the Puerto Rican economy. We believe
422
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that this is too narrow a view of the interests at stake
here.”426
The Court explicitly eschewed any bright-line limit “on
proportion of the population of the State that must be adversely
affected by the challenged behavior”, and directed courts to look at
“the indirect effects of the injury... in determining whether the
State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its
population.”427 The Court recognized that discrimination has a
pervasive effect on all Puerto Ricans: “This Court has had too
much experience with the political, social, and moral damage of
discrimination not to recognize that a State has a substantial
interest in assuring its residents that it will act to protect them from
these evils”.428 Discrimination rightfully resides in the pantheon of
social justice issues, right alongside the right to clean air, water
and food. Just as the commonwealth of Puerto Rico has a right to
protect its citizens from discrimination, tribes have a right to
protect their members from the host of oppressive ills that attack
their physical, cultural and economic well-being.
Despite the fluid and case-specific analysis required by
Snapp, several courts have imposed a heightened standard on tribal
litigants by requiring every single member of the tribe to suffer an
injury.429 Similar to PCBs, once these fallacious decisions belittling
tribal sovereignty enter the judicial environment, they persist. For
example, Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes has been repeatedly cited by
courts to exclude tribes from exercising their parens patriae
standing because they “failed to prove [the Tribe] was acting on
behalf of all of its members.”430 Just as PCBs travel up the food
chain, the reasoning of the Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes line of cases
has migrated into higher courts. For example, the Eighth Circuit
cited to Navajo Nation v. Superior Court of State of Washington for
Yakima County,431 and Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v.
426
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Chacon,432 to blithely assert that “[t]he parens patriae doctrine
cannot be used to confer standing on the Tribe to assert the rights of
a dozen or so members of the Tribe.”433
Another example of inequitable treatment by the courts is
seen through big tobacco litigation. In a perfunctory one-page
unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court
decision dismissing with prejudice the Alabama Coushatta Tribe of
Texas’ suit against tobacco companies over the negative health
effects caused by tobacco products.434 The Alabama Coushatta
Tribe brought the claim in its parens patriae capacity.435 Despite the
fact that many states had successfully asserted parens patriae
standing to sue big tobacco on similar grounds, the Fifth Circuit did
not discuss tribal sovereignty or parens patriae standing. Instead,
the court analogized the tribe to labor unions and denied standing
based on lack of direct injury.436 Subsequently, the tribe’s writ of
certiorari was denied.437
Tribes and other native sovereigns have also attempted to
assert their parens patriae standing to protect their cultural rights
and practices from the dangers posed by climate change.438 For
example, in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of
Interior, the Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska asserted its
parens patriae interests in “subsistence hunting, fishing, whaling,
and gathering, as well as cultural and religious activities” to sue the
U.S. Department of the Interior for approving leases off the Alaska
coast for oil and gas development.439 The Tenth Circuit found that
the Native Village of Point Hope had standing under their
procedural theory, but not under their substantive theory which
invoked their parens patriae interests: “Massachusetts's limited
432
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[special solicitude] holding does not extend to the standing analysis
in this case.”440 Thus, as the concurrence notes, the Tenth Circuit
side-stepped the issue of “whether the Native Village of Point Hope
has identified by affidavit particularized harms to its culture and way
of life from climate change sufficient to establish Article III
standing”.441
Perhaps the best example of a court vindicating tribal parens
patriae interests occurred in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida
v. United States.442 In that case, the Tribe sued over the federal
government’s management of water which caused flooding on tribal
lands.443 The court found that the Tribe used the land in question for
“cultural, religious, recreation, commercial, and subsistence
activities, including hunting, fishing, frogging, commercial airboating, and agriculture ... includ[ing] traditional subsistence
agriculture and cultivating corn on tree islands for religious
purposes.”444 Based on that finding, the court correctly invoked the
Snapp rationale to find a quasi-sovereign interest, because there
could be “little doubt that the Miccosukee Tribe's interests in
preserving basic elements of its culture and way of life affects the
general physical and economic health and well-being of Tribe
members.”445
The outcomes of recent cases seeking to extend the parens
patriae doctrine to encompass tribal and native quasi-sovereign
interests demonstrates the continued veracity of Justice Clarence
Thomas’ famous observation: “Federal Indian policy is, to say the
least, schizophrenic.”446 For example, the Quapaw Tribe of
Oklahoma successfully asserted parens patriae standing to sue
former lead and zinc mine owners and operators whose operations
resulted in extreme environmental hazards that persist to this day on
Quapaw Tribal land.447 The Tenth Circuit accepted the Quapaw
Tribe’s assertion of parens patriae standing without discussion, and
focused on issues of sovereign immunity.448 Eventually, after
decades of convoluted litigation and a congressional reference, the
440
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Quapaw Tribe is due to receive an almost $140 million
settlement.449
Other courts have found creative ways to avoid recognizing
the sovereign rights of native peoples. For example, in Territory of
American Samoa. v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the
Territory of American Samoa sued the United States over the
management of the Samoan fisheries.450 In that case, the Territory
asserted its parens patriae standing to protect its cultural fishing
practices and traditions.451 The district court of Hawaii relied on
Massachusetts v. EPA452 to recognize the Territory’s interest: “in
light of the longstanding significance of fishing to the fa'a Samoa,
Plaintiff has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the American
Samoan's cultural fishing rights to preserve their culture for the
benefit of the American Samoan people as a whole.”453 The district
court subsequently affirmed its standing analysis in an order
denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration.454 That victory for
native quasi-sovereign interests in cultural practices, however, was
short-lived. In 2020, the Tenth Circuit reversed in a cursory onepage opinion that avoided the parens patriae issue altogether: “This
appeal raises a question of whether the Government of American
Samoa ...can sue federal agencies under the doctrine of parens
patriae…Because parens patriae is a prudential doctrine and not a
jurisdictional limitation, we need not reach this issue, and instead
proceed to the merits.”455 Then, in a mere paragraph of analysis, the
court found that the relevant federal agency had “considered the
consequences of the rule on alia fishing boats, and rationally
determined the effects were not significant.”456
Thus, the foregoing cases, and particularly the recent
Quapaw Tribe and American Samoan litigation, illustrates the
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harrowing reality for tribes and native peoples seeking to protect
their people, land, and culture under the parens patriae
doctrine. Oftentimes, courts engage in a cursory, specious analysis
to dismiss legitimate tribal claims. However, where courts correctly
recognize tribal quasi-sovereign interests, the ensuing litigation is
contentious and prolonged, requiring incredible stamina and
fortitude from tribal governments to achieve a successful outcome.
Despite the various setbacks for tribes seeking to establish
their parens patriae standing to protect tribal interests, tribes and
other sovereigns continue to push those boundaries. Certainly, there
will be instances where tribal interests do not rise to the extent that
they implicate the parens patriae doctrine, but tribal claims deserve,
at a minimum, to be analyzed properly, a baseline of effort which
many courts have not deigned to make. A correct application of the
Snapp rationale and its progeny would recognize that tribes have a
parens patriae interest similar to that of states, and can sue to protect
their citizenry without proving that every single tribal member has
suffered an injury. As other commentators have argued, for
purposes of standing analysis, tribes should be accorded the same
“special solicitude” given to states.457
2. Monsanto’s treatment of the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe
Monsanto faces liability for PCB contamination from many
potential sources, including state and tribal sovereigns, local
government entities, and individuals. Undoubtedly, Monsanto has
an internal litigation plan in place to mitigate their potential losses
from these unique suits which combine elements of environmental,
product liability, and toxic tort law. In fact, officials with Bayer,
Monsanto’s parent company, have stated that money has already
been reserved for defending against PCB suits, although they
declined to name a specific amount.458 Furthermore, Monsanto
maintains its own product-liability insurance, although the details of
457
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that coverage were not disclosed.459 Finally, Monsanto has shown a
willingness to settle claims, as evidenced by their settlement with
the State of Washington, and attempts to settle with cities.
Monsanto’s response to the SRMT suit is strikingly different
from its response to the Washington AG suit and City of Seattle
litigation. Since as early in the litigation as the hearing on
Defendant's motion to dismiss, the SRMT has alleged that Monsanto
has “repeatedly treated the Tribe as ‘less than’ other sovereigns, and
has consistently misunderstood, or intentionally obscured, the fact
that the Tribe seeks damages for harms caused by Monsanto’s PCBs
to the Tribe’s interests.”460 The SRMT further accuses Monsanto of
“artificially and astronomically inflat[ing] the resources required for
the parties and this Court to ready the case for trial.”461
Why has Monsanto chosen to treat the SRMT differently
than other plaintiffs? Are those differences based in legal strategy,
or is there a more sinister, discriminatory rationale behind them?
Certainly, tribes differ from states and cities in many respects which
may prompt Monsanto to employ different strategies with each
respective sovereign. One possible explanation for Monsanto’s legal
strategy is the structural differences between the SRMT complaint
and other sovereign-led PCB litigation. Specifically, the
combination of individual and sovereign plaintiffs in the SRMT
complaint has been repeatedly, if unsuccessfully, attacked by
Monsanto, including in a failed motion to sever.462 Additionally, the
SRMT’s medical monitoring cause of action adds a layer of
complexity not seen in many other sovereign-led PCB suits. If the
SRMT is successful in pursuing its medical monitoring claim,
Monsanto will undoubtedly face similar claims in the future. But
those differences alone cannot explain Monsanto’s conduct.
Perhaps Monsanto is concerned that the sheer number of
federally recognized tribes represents a massive number of potential
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plaintiffs.463 Strategically, it may be prudent for Monsanto to settle
state suits that survive a motion to dismiss; as there are only fifty
states, each piece of litigation that is concluded removes a
significant source of liability. Although apparently willing to settle
with at least some states, Monsanto may be concerned that settling
with one tribe will encourage other tribes to file suit. States often
have more legal and financial resources than tribes to pursue this
type of complicated and costly litigation. For example, the budget
of the Washington Attorney General’s Office in the 2022-203
biennium is $374.9 million.464 Compare that to the 2022 budget for
the Attorney General of the Cherokee Nation, the United States‘
largest tribe, which is set at $10,000,000, and the resource disparity
is clear.465 However, the availability and recent successful use of
contingency-fee counsel puts tribes in a position to sue despite any
relative paucity of in-house legal resources.466
Another important difference between states and tribes is the
extent to which they have waived sovereign immunity. As sovereign
entities, Native American tribes possess immunity from suit absent
their consent or congressional abrogation.467 The federal
government and most states have waived their sovereign immunity
from suit to varying degrees through legislative action.468 In
contrast, many tribes have enacted very limited waivers of sovereign
immunity.469 Typically, such tribal waivers allow the tribal council
or other authorized tribal representative to waive the tribe’s
sovereign immunity for specific transactions with non-tribal
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entities.470 The ability to contractually waive sovereign immunity is
essential to the economic development of tribes, because many nontribal entities will not enter into agreements with a tribe unless those
agreements can be legally enforced.471 Thus, many tribes are
insulated from counterclaims to a much greater extent than states
and cities. However, certain courts have found that congress
abrogated tribal sovereign immunity472 in regards to the Clean
Water Act,473 the Safe Drinking Water Act,474 the Resources
Conservation and Recovery Act,475 and the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act.476
In addition to protecting government activities from suit,
tribal sovereign immunity also extends to a tribes’ commercial
activities both on and off reservation land.477 In 2015, the Supreme
Court upheld the sovereign immunity of tribal corporations
conducting activity off-reservation in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community.478 While ostensibly a victory for tribal interests, the
majority and dissenting opinions gave rise to concerns that “lower
courts may view the decision as signaling the Court's future
willingness to limit immunity [of tribal business corporations].”479
While it may be unlikely that tribal corporations have conducted offreservation activities linked to PCB contamination, tribes should be
cognizant of the volatility of the law concerning the immunity of
tribal business corporations.480
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Importantly, the filing of suit by a tribe does not waive tribal
sovereign immunity with respect to counterclaims,481
crossclaims,482 or compulsory counterclaims.483 However, tribes
may be subject to counterclaims for recoupment “arising out of the
same transaction, seeking relief of a similar kind, and in an amount
not in excess of the tribe's claim.”484 Thus, Monsanto may view
tribes as particularly dangerous litigants due to their immunity from
most counterclaims.
Regardless of Monsanto’s motivations and strategic
decisions, its actions speak clearly: by excluding SRMT from
settlement talks, Monsanto is perpetuating a long and sordid history
of corporate discrimination against Native Americans. As aptly put
by Tribal Chief Eric Thompson, “Bayer is selectively discriminating
against Native Americans, singling them out as not worthy of
compensation, and purporting that Tribal governments are less
sovereign than the ones with whom Bayer settled.”485 But the SRMT
is fighting back:
“The Tribe notes that Bayer’s racist tactics will not be
tolerated, and their actions will soon be held accountable in
front of a jury. Billions of dollars in liability remain and we
will no longer allow the Tribe to be swept under the carpet,
as Bayer and its corporate predecessors have done for
decades.”486
C. Proving Causation and Damages for Medical Costs
The SRMT is in the unenviable position of being well
situated to pursue a medical-monitoring claim as a result of the
myriad environmental and health studies conducted over decades in
regards to PCB contamination in Akwesasne. Beginning in the early
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1960’s, the first major health concerns stemmed from fluoride
emissions which were a byproduct of nearby aluminum smelting.487
Fluoride contamination caused cattle raised in Akwesasne to
develop serious health issues, such as swelling in their legs causing
immobility, loss of teeth, and a high calf mortality rate.488 In 1973,
the then-named Saint Regis Band Council responded by creating the
Department of Environment.489 In the late 1970’s, concerns about
contaminants, including PCBs, prompted the SRMT, New York
State and Canadian governments to issue advisories recommending
a drastic reduction of fish consumption, including advising that
pregnant women and children under age fifteen should avoid eating
any fish from waters located in Akwesasne.490
Naturally, the serious health problems seen in cattle, fish,
and other wildlife prompted concerns about the health effects of
industrial pollution amongst the Akwesasne community.491 Thus
began a long and continuing medical odyssey to understand the
extent to which industrial contaminants affected tribal members.
Notably, in 1982 the very first health study of Akwesasne members
revealed the presence of PCB in fat samples taken from tribal
members.492 In the ensuing decades, a plethora of studies driven by
tribal effort have confirmed links between the high PCB levels
found in tribal members to thyroid problems, negative cognitive
impacts, reproductive issues, diabetes, obesity, and heart disease.493
Many of those studies were funded using the Superfund Research
Program, which awards grants to researchers studying health and
environmental issues linked to hazardous waste sites.494
This long history of environmental contamination and
exposure to PCBs and the ensuing research makes the SRMT well
positioned to pursue claims against Monsanto for PCB
contamination. Importantly, the scientific body of research
continues to grow regarding the harms caused by PCBs, putting
tribes in an increasingly good position to act against Monsanto via
civil suit.
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The scale of sovereign-led suits complicates the task of
proving causation and damages for medical costs incurred by a
sovereign to monitor, diagnose and treat its citizens for exposure to
toxic substances. In an individual cause of action, it is often
reasonable and not overly burdensome to require a plaintiff to
divulge a broad spectrum of information, including complete
records of their medical treatment. Lawyers and experts for both
parties use such information to litigate specific causation as well as
damages. When a sovereign sues for medical expenses it has
incurred and will continue to incur to protect its citizens from harm,
however, the sheer scale of medical records involved, as well as the
privacy interest of third parties, necessitates a different approach.
For example, in the SRMT case, Monsanto requested all the medical
records for all 814 Tribal members who allegedly suffered harm
from PCB exposure in the form of certain types of cancer and
cardiovascular disease.495 In an affidavit to the court, the director of
the SRMT’s medical clinic explained that it would take one
employee approximately 26 hours per patient to collect the
requested medical documents and redact identifying information
and that each patient’s file would consist of over 2000 pages.496 In
fact, it took SRMT medical staff 14 hours to collect, print, and redact
20 years of a representative patient's medical records which were
provided to Monsanto in discovery.497
In light of the incredible burden such discovery places on
sovereign plaintiffs pursuing damages related to public health crises,
courts have differentiated such cases from those where individuals
pursue claims. In fact, courts around the nation have recently been
inundated with cases presenting eerily similar claims and discovery
disputes based on another public health crisis – the opioid epidemic.
For example, the State of Oklahoma sued a number of opioid
manufacturers for their role in causing and perpetuating the opioid
epidemic.498 In Oklahoma, the Special Discovery Master rejected
the opioid manufacturers' requests that the state provide discovery
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regarding 950,000 patients and 42,000 doctors contained in the
State’s database and allowed the State to prove its case using
statistical analysis.499 Similarly, in the State of Ohio’s recent
litigation against opioid manufacturers, the Special Discovery
master found “clearly overbroad” Defendants’ production request to
identify “any person that Plaintiff claims was harmed in any way by
any Defendant, all documents concerning each such person’s
medical history [and] medical treatment . . . and any other records
relating to the use of any prescription or over-the-counter
medications or illicit drugs.”500 Thus, although a medical monitoring
claim involves complicated discovery issues, there are ample recent
precedents involving Native American tribes that can help inform
future tribal litigation.
D. Contingency Fee Counsel
The use of contingency fee counsel to vindicate public rights
is a long-standing practice that has engendered significant
controversy.501 The State of Washington Attorney General’s office
and the City of Seattle502 both hired private firms on a contingency
basis to pursue their claims against Monsanto. In general, the use of
contingency fee counsel is well established in American
jurisprudence and is recognized as a legitimate and ethical
arrangement by all fifty states.503 The use of outside counsel is
attractive for various reasons: it lessens the financial burden of
litigating complicated tort causes of action and leverages the
specific tort expertise of private firms.504
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The use of contingency fee counsel was challenged by
Monsanto in the City of Seattle’s suit on the basis that such an
arrangement violated the ethical rules of Washington law.505 The
basic argument is that since private counsel are paid on a
contingency-fee basis, and therefore have a direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the case, that such counsel has a conflict of
interest; they may place their own financial interests above the
interests of the public. Courts that have addressed this issue have
held that the use of contingent counsel in public nuisance cases are
not categorically barred provided that the government attorneys,
who are neutral and conflict free, retain control over all
discretionary decisions made to advance the litigation. 506
In the City of Seattle’s tort action against Monsanto for PCB
contamination, for example, the court rejected Monsanto’s
argument that that the use of contingent counsel was unethical,
relying on the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in a similar
case.507 Thus, tribal sovereigns and government entities are not
categorically barred from employing private contingent counsel,
assuming that tribal attorneys maintain control over the decision
making process, including decisions regarding settlement.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Native American tribes face serious and challenging
environmental issues that affect their health, way of life, and
economic well-being. One of those issues, PCB contamination, is at
the forefront of emerging tort theories seeking to hold Monsanto
financially responsible for the harms it caused through the
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manufacture and distribution of products containing PCBs.
Although many states, cities and municipal bodies have sued
Monsanto over PCB, only one tribe thus far, the St. Regis Mohawk
Tribe, has attempted to hold Monsanto accountable through these
emerging tort theories. Tragically, much of the blueprint for tribal
tort litigation for PCB contamination is founded on a true narrative
of the past, present, and future pain and suffering of Native
Americans. As tribes enter into a post-McGirt508 era where,
hopefully, courts continue to progress in their respect for tribal
sovereignty, tribes have an opportunity to sue in their parens patriae
and proprietary capacities to remedy harms suffered by the tribe.
There is no doubt that PCBs have caused immense harm to tribes
and will continue to do so until PCBs cease to be omnipresent in the
environment, fish, animals, and the very bodies of Native Americans
themselves. Although PCB contamination is a global problem, it
disproportionately affects Native communities, because those
communities not only often live in highly contaminated areas and
traditionally subsist on large quantities of now contaminated fish
and wildlife, but also because tribes have a sacred connection to the
land, water, and creatures with whom they lived in harmony since
time immemorial.
No mere civil suit can ever hope to solve the litany of issues
caused by PCB contamination, but a settlement or award of damages
can provide valuable resources for tribes attempting to cross the dark
and fearful river through remediating the environment and providing
medical screening and care to tribal members at risk for or suffering
from diseases linked to PCB exposure.

508

See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020).
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